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THE PUBLIC BELIEVES PREDISPUTE 
BINDING ARBITRATION CLAUSES ARE UNJUST:  
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DISPUTE-SYSTEM 
DESIGN IN THE TIME OF VANISHING TRIALS 
 
Victor D. Quintanilla* & Alexander B. Avtgis** 
INTRODUCTION 
One troubling cause of the decline in civil trials is the growing ubiquity of 
predispute binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.1  Over the past 
decade, two interacting patterns have come to encourage transactional 
attorneys to engage in zealous advocacy when crafting such clauses.  First, 
recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence broadly defers and delegates 
authority to those who create binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts 
with little oversight.2  Second, members of the public rarely read or 
understand these clauses buried in boilerplate language.3 
 These clauses displace the legal backdrop of fair, legitimate, and just 
public legal institutions with the dispute-system procedure most preferred by 
those who draft and design adhesion contracts.4  Therefore, norms of zealous 
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colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at Fordham 
University School of Law.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ 
Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial:  Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, 
Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017). 
**  J.D./M.P.A. candidate, 2017, Maurer School of Law and School of Public and 
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 1. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 
YALE L.J. 3052, 3074–75 (2015); Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United 
States District Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745, 752 (2010) (“As trials have declined, private 
arbitrations have grown exponentially. . . .  [A]lternative dispute resolution (ADR) has gained 
a life of its own.”). 
 2. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:  The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in the Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2808–11 (2015). 
 3. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?:  Consumer Attention to 
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (2014); Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. 
Rustad, Fundamentally Unfair:  An Empirical Analysis of Social Media Arbitration Clauses, 
65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 341, 380–82 (2014). 
 4. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV 
1631, 1649 (2005); Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural 
Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 188 (2012). 
2120 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
advocacy may collide with a wider and more virtuous ethic that considers 
third parties and the public’s desire for a fair, legitimate, and just civil justice 
system.5 
 Before turning to the dialectic between these two ethical principles, we 
report a psychological experiment conducted with the American public.6  The 
study randomly assigned members of the public into conditions that varied 
the amount they learned about the procedure (for example, a legal definition, 
an example clause, a New York Times article) and asked them to rate the 
fairness and justice of binding arbitration.  The experiment reveals that the 
more the public learns about predispute binding arbitration clauses, the more 
they believe this dispute-resolution procedure is unjust and illegitimate.  Yet, 
the vast majority of participants mistakenly believed that they had never 
agreed to a binding arbitration clause. 
 Drawing on these findings, we discuss the pressing need for a wider ethic 
that applies to transactional attorneys who design binding arbitration clauses 
within adhesion contracts.  We also draw lessons from behavioral legal ethics 
and social psychology.  These lessons reveal that this wider ethic may be 
endangered by the situational influences that currently operate within law 
firms (and in-house) due to these two intersecting patterns.  We discuss ways 
of altering the regulatory environment to encourage the wider ethic to 
flourish. 
I.  PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON 
PREDISPUTE BINDING CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
While the number of empirical legal studies on predispute binding 
consumer arbitration has increased since AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion7 
and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,8 this body of 
literature has been eclipsed by the rise in the use of binding arbitration clauses 
in adhesion contracts9 and the power of these clauses as reinforced by the 
post-Concepcion, post-Italian Colors legal regime.10 
 
 5. See generally David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839 (1999); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design?:  And 
What We Should [Not] Do About It:  Lessons from International and Domestic Fronts, 14 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195 (2009); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy 
and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006). 
 6. The authors conducted this survey, which is referenced repeatedly throughout this 
Article as Victor D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, Survey on Binding Arbitration (Aug. 
2016) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Survey]. 
 7. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 8. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 9. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY:  REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT § 1028(a) (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-
report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BPH-XN97]; Myriam Gilles, Killing Them 
with Kindness:  Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2013). 
 10. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution:  An Empirical 
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 60 (2014). 
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Legal scholars have empirically examined several important issues that 
relate to whether consumers meaningfully consent to predispute binding 
consumer arbitration.  For example, a body of literature examines consumers’ 
general understanding of standard-form contracts and included contract 
terms.  This research reveals both that consumers rarely read the fine print in 
adhesion contracts,11 and even in the rare instances when they do, they 
seldom understand the meaning and effect of binding arbitration clauses.12 
Recent empirical legal studies that explore predispute binding arbitration 
clauses, and particularly those clauses with class waivers, focus on the 
growing prevalence of these clauses themselves13 or the content, legal 
implications, or varying effects that such clauses have for consumers and 
employees.14  These studies find that predispute binding consumer arbitration 
clauses and class action waivers are ubiquitous and that their use is rising.15  
Furthermore, these studies reveal that members of the public, as one-shot 
players, often fare poorly in binding arbitration.16  Not surprisingly, the mere 
existence of a predispute binding consumer arbitration clause or class action 
waiver reduces the likelihood of securing counsel.17 
These lines of inquiry surely deepen our knowledge of the extent to which 
consumers and employees truly consent to these terms and the effect of this 
legal backdrop, while leaving open the question of what an ordinary member 
of the public thinks and feels about these clauses after learning their effect.  
In short, a gap exists in the body of empirical work.18 
 
 11. See, e.g., Thomas J. Maronick, Do Consumers Read Terms of Service Agreements 
When Installing Software?:  A Two-Study Empirical Analysis, 4 INT’L J. BUS. & SOC. RES. 137, 
144 (2014); Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts:  True Tales of Consumer Contracting 
Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 886–87 (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Bakos et al., supra note 3, at 2; Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” 
with Unexpected Consequences:  An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of 
Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 81 (2015) (demonstrating a “profound lack of 
understanding about the existence and effect of arbitration agreements”); Debra P. Stark & 
Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive:  Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer 
Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 671–73 (2009). 
 13. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:  
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007); Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers:  An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses 
in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 895 (2008). 
 14. For example, David Horton and Andrea Cann Chandrasekher examine an extensive 
dataset of American Arbitration Association complaints as well as report filing rates, 
outcomes, damages, costs, and case lengths. See Horton & Cann Chandrasekher, supra note 
10, at 91–102. 
 15. See generally Gilles, supra note 9; Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of 
Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643 (2012). 
 16. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 10, at 57. 
 17. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees:  How American Employers Are 
Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 
1309, 1334 (2015) (“[G]iven the economics of how plaintiff-side employment attorneys are 
compensated, when employers impose mandatory arbitration clauses they make it more 
difficult for employees to secure legal representation.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Reform:  What We Know and What We Need 
to Know, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 579 (2009). 
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Prior studies underscore that the public fails to grasp what these terms in 
adhesion contracts mean when seeking goods, services, credit, or 
employment.  Here, we investigate what the public thinks and feels about 
binding consumer arbitration after learning about the actual meaning and 
significance of predispute binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.  
Our study seeks to simulate the critical moment in which a member of the 
public learns from a legal professional, after his or her dispute has arisen, that 
the dispute is bound by a predispute binding arbitration clause.  We will also 
describe the implications of this experience on the ethics of dispute-system 
design in our general discussion. 
II.  EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDY:  HOW DOES LEARNING ABOUT 
PREDISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION CLAUSES AFFECT 
THE PUBLIC’S PERCEPTION OF THE DISPUTE PROCEDURE? 
Our empirical legal study examined the extent to which learning about 
predispute binding arbitration clauses affects the way in which ordinary 
members of the public view the dispute procedure.  We conducted a 
psychological experiment that investigated the hypothesis that the more that 
ordinary members of the American public learn about the meaning and 
significance of predispute binding arbitration clauses, the more they think the 
practice is unfair and unjust.  We hypothesized that, relative to providing 
them (1) no information (and simply testing their lay beliefs); (2) a legal 
definition of binding arbitration; or (3) a sample predispute binding 
arbitration clause, after learning about the meaning of predispute binding 
arbitration clauses in a New York Times article reporting how ordinary 
Americans are affected by the dispute-resolution procedure, their beliefs 
about the justice and fairness of binding consumer arbitration would 
diminish. 
A.  Method:  Design and Participants 
Our study employed a single-factor, between-subjects design consisting of 
four conditions that cumulatively increased exposure to information:  (1) a 
“no information” condition, (2) a “legal definition of binding arbitration” 
condition, (3) a “legal definition of binding arbitration and an example 
predispute binding arbitration clause” condition, and (4) a “legal definition 
of binding arbitration, an example predispute binding arbitration clause, and 
a New York Times article” condition.  We recruited 400 participants (N = 400) 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Amazon Mechanical Turk is widely 
employed within the behavioral and social sciences as a platform to recruit 
nationally representative samples of the American public.19  Of the total 
 
 19. See generally Krista Casler et al., Separate but Equal?:  A Comparison of Participants 
and Data Gathered via Amazon’s MTurk, Social Media, and Face-to-Face Behavioral 
Testing, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2156, 2156–60 (2013); John J. Horton et al., The Online 
Laboratory:  Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399 
(2011); Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411 (2010).  Participants received a $1.00 payment as 
compensation for participation in our study. 
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recruited, seventy-one participants failed the study’s manipulation check 
(described below) and were excluded from analyses.  Thus, the final sample 
consisted of 329 adults who passed the study’s manipulation check.  This 
sample included 190 males (57.8 percent) and 139 females (42.2 percent) and 
comprised the following self-reported racial/ethnic groups:  75.4 percent 
Caucasian/white, 8.5 percent Asian/Asian American, 5.8 percent African 
American/black, 7.3 percent Hispanic, 0.3 percent Native American and 2.7 
percent other.  Geographically, participants resided in thirty-nine states.  The 
majority of participants either graduated from a four-year college/university 
(40.7 percent) or had studied at such a college/university (13.4 percent).  The 
average age of the sample of the American public was 36.19 years 
(M = 36.19, SD = 12.23). 
B.  Procedure 
After reading an introduction for the research study, participants gave their 
informed consent to participate in an online survey about dispute-resolution 
procedures.  Participants were then randomly assigned by the Qualtrics 
platform to one of the following four conditions. 
In the “no information” condition, participants read this prompt:  “In this 
survey, you will be asked for your opinions about two procedures for 
resolving disputes that consumers bring against financial companies, such as 
credit card issuers, banks, private student loan companies, and mobile 
wireless companies.  These two procedures are (1) binding arbitration and (2) 
trial.”  After reading this introductory statement, the participants proceeded 
to the next page of the survey where they rated the dependent measures 
described below. 
In the “legal definition of binding arbitration” condition, participants read 
the introductory statement and then immediately proceeded to the next page 
of the survey, which stated: 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines arbitration as follows:  arbitration n. A 
dispute-resolution process in which the disputing parties choose one or 
more neutral third parties to make a final and binding decision resolving 
the dispute.  The parties to the dispute may choose a third party directly by 
mutual agreement, or indirectly, such as by agreeing to have an arbitration 
organization select the third party.—Also termed (redundantly) binding 
arbitration—arbitrate, vb.—arbitral, adj.20 
In the “example binding arbitration clause” condition, participants read the 
introductory statement and the legal definition of binding arbitration, and 
they were then provided an example binding arbitration clause, which stated: 
Applicable Law; Arbitration.  This website is arranged, sponsored, and 
managed in the state of Washington, USA.  The laws of the state of 
Washington govern this Agreement and all of its terms and conditions, 
without giving effect to any principles of conflicts of laws.  You agree that 
any action at law or in equity arising out of or relating to these terms and 
conditions shall be submitted to confidential arbitration in Seattle, 
 
 20. This quote is drawn from Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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Washington, except that, to the extent you have in any manner violated or 
threatened to violate our intellectual property rights, we may seek 
injunctive or other appropriate relief in any state or federal court in the state 
of Washington, and you consent to exclusive jurisdiction and venue in such 
courts.  Arbitration under this agreement shall be conducted under the rules 
then prevailing of the American Arbitration Association.  The arbitrator’s 
award shall be binding and may be entered as a judgment in any court of 
competent jurisdiction.  To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, 
no arbitration under this Agreement shall be joined to an arbitration 
involving any other party subject to this Agreement, whether through class 
arbitration proceedings or otherwise. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, this was virtually the same clause 
governing their employment as workers of Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
In the “New York Times article” condition, participants read the 
introductory statement, the legal definition of binding arbitration, the 
example binding arbitration clause, and a New York Times article entitled 
“Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice” by Jessica Silver-
Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, dated October 31, 2015.  This article was 
the first in an important trilogy of articles reporting an investigation 
conducted by the New York Times on how binding consumer arbitration 
affects ordinary members of the American public.  For most members of the 
public, this article was their introduction to the real-world meaning and 
significance of predispute binding consumer arbitration clauses.  The article 
begins with the statement: 
 On Page 5 of a credit card contract used by American Express, beneath 
an explainer on interest rates and late fees, past the details about annual 
membership, is a clause that most customers probably miss.  If cardholders 
have a problem with their account, American Express explains, the 
company “may elect to resolve any claim by individual arbitration.” 
 . . . . 
 Over the last few years, it has become increasingly difficult to apply for 
a credit card, use a cellphone, get cable or Internet service, or shop online 
without agreeing to private arbitration.  The same applies to getting a job, 
renting a car or placing a relative in a nursing home.21 
After reading and learning the information in each of the conditions, they 
turned to the dependent measures described in detail below.  Participants 
completed a manipulation check to ensure that they correctly understood the 
information presented, also described below.  Afterward, participants 
 
 21. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the 
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https:// 
perma.cc/HZX7-K7F8].  Most scholars and readers regarded this news account as highlighting 
the growing ubiquity of predispute binding arbitration clauses and the way in which these 
clauses insulate entities from liability. See DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471–76 
(2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Constructions of Arbitration’s 
Informalism:  Autonomy, Efficiency, and Justice, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 142.  Some have 
criticized the article, arguing that the greater problem is predispute binding arbitration clauses 
that ban class-wide relief. See David B. Lipsky, The New York Times’ Attack on Arbitration, 
22 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 6, 6 (2016). 
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completed a short demographic questionnaire (about, for example, gender, 
age, race, education, and residential state).  They then indicated which of 
several statements applied to them, such as, “I am a person who has signed a 
binding arbitration clause.”22  Participants then indicated whether and how 
certain they were that, “[b]y using Mturk, have you entered into a binding 
arbitration clause with Amazon?”23  Finally, they were asked to “[p]lease 
explain your response so that we can understand your answers.”24 
C.  Measures 
This section describes the dependent measures that the participants 
completed. 
1.  Familiarity 
On a seven-point scale ranging from one (“not at all familiar”) to seven 
(“very familiar”), we asked participants to rate for trial and binding 
arbitration:  “How familiar are you with the following procedures for 
resolving disputes that consumers have with financial companies, such as 
credit card issuers, banks, private student loan companies, and mobile 
wireless companies?”25 
2.  Justice and Legitimacy Items 
Participants were then asked to rate trial and binding arbitration on six 
items that relate to perceived fairness, unfairness, justice, accuracy, 
effectiveness, and legitimacy:  “Using the scales provided, please rate trial 
and binding arbitration as ways of resolving disputes that consumers bring 
against financial companies, such as credit card companies, banks, private 
student loan providers, and mobile wireless companies.”26  We asked 
participants to rate trial and binding arbitration on each of these six items, 
again, on a seven-point scale ranging from one (“not at all”) to seven 
(“very”):  how fair, unfair, just, accurate, effective, and legitimate are the 
following procedures?27  As described below, these six measures were highly 
correlated with feelings toward binding arbitration and converged on a single 
underlying factor, referred to as an “anticipated experience of justice.” 
3.  Feelings Toward Trial and Binding Arbitration 
A seven-point scale assessed how participants feel toward trial and binding 
arbitration as ways of resolving disputes (very negative, negative, somewhat 
negative, neutral, somewhat positive, positive, very positive).28 
 
 22. Survey, supra note 6. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
2126 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
4.  Favorability Toward Binding Arbitration 
Participants also rated how favorable or unfavorable they feel toward 
binding arbitration (very unfavorable, unfavorable, somewhat unfavorable, 
neutral, somewhat favorable, favorable, very favorable), and they were asked 
to explain those feelings toward binding arbitration “so that we can 
understand your impressions.”29 
5.  Manipulation Check 
A manipulation-check item assessed whether participants correctly 
recalled the information that they read about binding arbitration.  Participants 
were asked: 
In today’s study, you were presented with and read, (1) Black’s Law 
Dictionary’s definition of arbitration, (2) Black’s Law Dictionary’s 
definition of arbitration AND an example arbitration clause, (3) Black’s 
Law Dictionary’s definition of arbitration, and example arbitration clause, 
AND a New York Times article on binding arbitration, or (4) None of the 
above.  I simply recorded my impressions of trial and binding arbitration.30 
D.  Results 
This section describes the results of the survey and how we analyzed 
them. 
1.  Measuring Results:  The Analytic Strategy 
Before turning to results, we describe our analytic strategy.  First, an initial 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) omnibus test examined whether there were 
statistically significant differences between conditions for each dispute-
resolution procedure:  trial and binding arbitration.  Next, if the omnibus test 
indicated that the conditions significantly differed, Tukey honest significant 
difference (HSD) post hoc tests probed for differences between the 
information conditions to specifically examine whether the New York Times 
article condition was different from all other information conditions.  All 
means and standard deviations for each dependent variable (by label) are 
reported in table 1 in the appendix. 
2.  Familiarity 
An ANOVA revealed that participants’ prior familiarity with binding 
arbitration did not statistically differ across information conditions, 
F(3, 325) = 0.92, p = .431, ηp2 = .01.31  In addition, participants’ prior 
familiarity with trial did not differ across information conditions, 
F(3, 325) = 0.93, p = .427, ηp2 = .01.  As such, the randomization of 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See infra Table 1. 
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participants with different levels of prior familiarity for these procedures 
between conditions was successful. 
3.  Justice and Legitimacy Items 
(i) Fairness.  An ANOVA revealed that information had a significant 
effect on perceptions of the fairness of binding consumer arbitration, 
F(3, 325) = 21.07, p < .000, ηp2 = .16.32  Tukey tests explored potential 
differences between the New York Times article condition and all the other 
information conditions.  Results revealed that the New York Times article 
condition (M = 3.27, SD = 1.58) differed from all other conditions:  no 
information condition (M = 3.99, SD = 1.36) (p = .011), definition condition 
(M = 5.00, SD = 1.37) (p < .000), and sample clause condition (M = 4.57, 
SD = 1.43) (p < .000).33  The more participants learned about the meaning 
and significance of predispute binding consumer arbitration clauses, the more 
their ratings of the fairness of binding arbitration decreased. 
(ii) Legitimacy.  An ANOVA revealed that information also had a 
significant effect on perceptions of the legitimacy of binding consumer 
arbitration, F(3, 325) = 19.05, p < .000, ηp2 = .15.34  Tukey tests explored 
potential differences between the New York Times article condition and all 
the other information conditions.  Results again revealed that the New York 
Times article condition (M = 3.59, SD = 1.69) differed from all other 
conditions:  no information condition (M = 4.71, SD = 1.66) (p < .000), 
definition condition (M = 5.51, SD = 1.49) (p < .000), and sample clause 
condition (M = 5.02, SD = 1.58) (p < .000).35  As participants learned more 
about how ordinary Americans are affected by predispute binding arbitration 
clauses, their ratings of the legitimacy of the procedure decreased. 
The pattern of results observed for “fairness” and “legitimacy” was 
replicated across all seven justice and legitimacy dependent measures, 
including the remaining measures of “unfairness,” “justness,” “accuracy,” 
and “effectiveness.”36  In short, the more the public learns about how 
predispute binding arbitration clauses operate, the more unfair and unjust 
they find the dispute procedure. 
 
 32. See infra Table 1. 
 33. For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1. 
 34. See infra Table 1. 
 35. For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1. 
 36. See infra Table 2.  Above, we report the influence of learning about predispute binding 
arbitration clauses on attitudes toward binding arbitration.  Here, we report the influence of 
learning about predispute binding arbitration clauses on attitudes toward trial.  Taken together, 
the information read did not significantly affect perceptions of fairness of trial 
F(3, 325) = 1.47, p = .224, ηp2 = .01 (MGrand = 5.28, SDGrand = 1.34), perceptions of the 
unfairness of trial, F(3, 325) = 0.143, p = .934, ηp2 = .00 (MGrand = 2.84, SDGrand = 1.44), 
perceptions of the accuracy of trial, F(3, 325) = 2.06, p = .105, ηp2 = .02 (MGrand = 4.93, 
SDGrand = 1.30), or perceptions of the justness of trial, F(3, 325) = 1.44, p = .231, ηp2 = .01 
(MGrand = 5.23, SDGrand = 1.38).  The information read marginally affected perceptions of the 
effectiveness of trial, F(3, 325) = 2.12, p = .098, ηp2 = .02 (MGrand = 5.14, SDGrand = 1.34), and 
the legitimacy of trial, F(3, 325) = 2.41, p = .067, ηp2 = .02 (MGrand = 5.75, SDGrand = 1.31). 
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4.  Feelings Toward Trial and Binding Arbitration 
An ANOVA revealed that learning about binding consumer arbitration had 
a significant effect on feelings toward the dispute procedure, 
F(3, 322) = 27.19, p < .000, ηp2 = .20.37  Tukey tests explored potential 
differences between the New York Times article condition and all the other 
information conditions.  Results revealed that the New York Times article 
condition (M = 2.58, SD = 1.53) differed from the no information condition 
(M = 3.93, SD = 1.47) (p < .000), the definition condition (M = 4.74, 
SD = 1.42) (p < .000), and the sample clause condition (M = 4.26, SD = 1.62) 
(p < .000).38  As compared to the other conditions, after participants read the 
New York Times article depicting how ordinary Americans are affected by 
the dispute-resolution procedure, they had greater negative feelings toward 
binding arbitration.  The information provided did not have a significant 
effect on feelings toward trial, F(3, 325) = 1.61, p = .187, ηp2 = .02 
(MGrand = 4.98, SDGrand = 1.39). 
5.  Favorability Toward Binding Arbitration 
An ANOVA revealed that learning about binding consumer arbitration had 
a significant effect on the favorability toward this dispute procedure, 
F(3, 325) = 27.18, p < .000, ηp2 = .20.39  Tukey tests explored potential 
differences between the New York Times article condition and all the other 
information conditions.  Results revealed that the New York Times article 
condition (M = 2.61, SD = 1.53) differed from all other conditions:  no 
information condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.61) (p < .000), definition condition 
(M = 4.78, SD = 1.35) (p < .000), and sample clause condition (M = 4.35, 
SD = 1.67) (p < .000).40  As compared to the other conditions, when 
participants learned about how ordinary Americans are affected by binding 
arbitration, they found the dispute-resolution procedure less favorable. 
  
 
 37. See infra Figure 1, Table 1. 
 38. For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1. 
 39. See infra Table 1. 
 40. For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1. 
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Figure 1:  Categories in this figure and in table 1 in the appendix reflect 
reading information and cumulate as follows:  No information, Black’s 
Law Dictionary definition, Sample clause from Amazon Mturk agreement, 
and New York Times article.  Means and 95% CI are represented. 
 
6.  Anticipated Experience of Justice 
After establishing the interitem correlation of the justice and legitimacy 
items, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis to test the extent to which 
these measures form a single composite and load onto a single latent factor.  
Ultimately, we concluded that these seven measures converged on a single 
underlying factor—an anticipated experience of justice with binding 
consumer arbitration.  We then conducted a one-way ANOVA to examine 
the influence of learning about binding arbitration on anticipated experiences 
of justice. 
To begin, table 3 in the appendix reveals the interitem correlation between 
these dependent measures.  As can be observed, the variables are highly 
correlated, with all interitem Pearson’s R rising above .446.  This indicates 
that the psychological experiences reflected by these dependent measures are 
highly correlated. 
Next, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis, which revealed a 
Cronbach’s α of .936.  This evidences a high reliability that these items reflect 
an underlying construct.  Therefore, we conducted an exploratory factor 
analysis, which revealed that all seven dependent measures are explained by 
a single underlying factor.  The cross-scenario solution yielded one 
significant eigenvalue of 5.10 for all seven measures, respectively, 
cumulatively explaining 72.79 percent of the total variation.  The KMO 
statistic was .935 with a significant Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (p < .001), 
indicating the appropriateness of the factor analysis. 
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An ANOVA revealed that learning about binding consumer arbitration had 
a significant effect on anticipated experiences of justice, F(3, 325) = 28.46, 
p < .000,  ηp2 = .21.41  Tukey tests explored potential differences between the 
New York Times article condition and all the other information conditions.  
Results revealed that the New York Times article condition (M = 3.22, 
SD = 1.29) differed from all other conditions:  no information condition 
(M = 4.20, SD = 1.20) (p = .001), definition condition (M = 4.99, SD = 1.16) 
(p < .000), and sample clause condition (M =4.61, SD = 1.27) (p < .000).42  
As compared to the other conditions, when participants learned how ordinary 
Americans are affected by binding arbitration, their anticipated experiences 
of justice in this dispute-resolution procedure greatly diminished. 
 
Figure 2:  Categories reflect reading information presented and cumulate 
as follows:  No information, Black’s Law Dictionary definition, Sample 
clause from Amazon Mturk agreement, and New York Times article.  
Means and 95% CI are represented. 
 
7.  Beliefs the Public Holds About Whether They Have 
Entered into Binding Arbitration Clauses 
After responding to these measures, participants then completed a brief 
demographic questionnaire, which asked them to “[p]lease mark any of the 
following statements that apply to you.”43  The first category was, “I am a 
person who has signed a binding arbitration clause,” and it was listed first 
 
 41. See infra Table 1, infra Figure 2. 
 42. For all means and comparisons, see infra Table 1. 
 43. Survey, supra note 6. 
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and quite conspicuously before several other categories.44  The list also 
contained a “none of the above” option below these categories. 
Troublingly, 71.4 percent (235 participants) marked “none of the above,” 
and only 14.9 percent (49 participants) indicated that they have signed a 
binding arbitration clause.  These responses are patently incorrect for at least 
two reasons.  First, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s empirical 
research reveals that binding arbitration clauses are ubiquitous and that tens 
of millions of consumers use consumer financial products or services that are 
subject to predispute arbitration clauses, including mobile wireless phones 
(87.5 percent of contracts covering 99.9 percent of the market). 
 
Figure 3:  Beliefs that the public holds about whether they have signed 
contracts with binding arbitration clauses.  The vast majority of the 
participants did not believe that they had signed a contract with a binding 
arbitration clause. 
 
Second, by definition, all of these participants (100 percent) as workers on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk’s online platform have entered into a predispute 
binding arbitration clause with a class action waiver.  Indeed, by registering 
 
 44. These additional categories were “I have legal training or experience,” “I am an 
arbitrator,” “I own or run a business,” “I am a person who has a claim or dispute that involves 
or involved a binding consumer arbitration clause,” “I am affiliated with a public interest 
group,” “I am a person who has filed a claim in court,” “I am a person who has defended 
myself against a claim in court,” and “None of the Above.” Id. 
14.90%
85.10%
Beliefs the Public Holds About                    
Signing Contracts with 
Binding-Arbitration Clauses
[Yes]: I am a person
who has signed a
binding arbitration
clause.
[No]: I am not a person
who has signed a
binding arbitration
clause.
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for and using the site, all workers had agreed “to be bound by all terms and 
conditions of this agreement,” which included virtually the precise predispute 
binding arbitration clause used in the study.45 
Finally, we asked participants, “By using MTurk, have you entered into a 
binding arbitration clause with Amazon?”46  Most participants marked “no” 
(66 percent, 217 participants); some participants marked “yes” (34 percent, 
112 participants).47 
 
Figure 4:  Beliefs Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers hold about 
whether they have entered into a binding arbitration clause with Amazon. 
 
Importantly, we then followed up by asking them, “How certain are you of 
your response?” on a zero (not at all certain) to 100 (very certain) scale.48  
The median indicated uncertainty (Median = 40).  We combined the 
dichotomous scores with the continuous score to create a score for each 
participant ranging from −100 (very certain that they did not enter into a 
binding arbitration clause with AMT) to 100 (very certain that they entered 
into binding arbitration clause with AMT).  The mean score on this scale 
 
 45. See Amazon Mechanical Turk Participation Agreement, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK,  
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/conditionsofuse (last updated Dec. 2, 2014) [https:// 
perma.cc/2WG5-JKS4].  The only alteration to the clause was replacing “Amazon” and 
“Amazon Mechanical Turk” with “We” and “Our” to retain anonymity. 
 46. Survey, supra note 6. 
 47. See infra Figure 4. 
 48. Survey, supra note 6. 
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indicated that most participants were very uncertain but tilted toward 
believing (mistakenly) that they had not entered into a binding arbitration 
clause with Amazon Mechanical Turk (M = −7.98, SD = 56.03, 95% CI 
[−14.05, −1.90]).  Illustrative explanations included, “I do not know,” “I 
don’t believe there is a binding arbitration clause with Amazon, but I signed 
up with Mturk long enough ago that I don’t remember all the terms and 
conditions,” “I feel that binding arbitration clauses are common with a lot of 
companies,” and “Probably was in the fine print.” 
III.  IMPLICATIONS ON THE ETHICS 
OF DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN 
This empirical legal study reveals that, when members of the public learn 
how predispute binding arbitration clauses operate, they feel that the 
arbitration process is unfair and unjust.  Hence, the empirical study highlights 
a situation in which zealous advocacy norms conflict with ethical ideals that 
seek to mitigate harm to third parties and the public.  Mainly, if transactional 
attorneys zealously advance their client’s economic interest when crafting 
predispute binding arbitration clauses within adhesion contracts, this may 
degrade the rule of law, including rule-of-law norms and rule-of-law 
culture,49 imperiling the long-term viability of our legal institutions.  Given 
the extant legal landscape in which the U.S. Supreme Court has delegated 
broad discretion to firms to craft binding arbitration clauses in adhesion 
contracts with little judicial oversight,50 psychological influences within law 
firms and companies51 make it more likely that transactional attorneys will 
serve as zealous advocates rather than virtuous agents who consider the long-
term harm to the public caused by the degradation of legal institutions.  Even 
so, structural changes in the legal landscape may alter these dynamics and 
make it more likely that the wider ethical ideal will flourish. 
A.  The Public Learns the Significance of Predispute 
Binding Arbitration Clauses After Disputes Arise 
The more the public learns about predispute binding arbitration clauses, 
the more the public believes binding arbitration is unjust and illegitimate.  
Yet most members of the public first learn how predispute binding arbitration 
clauses affect them after their disputes arise, and especially after they consult 
with legal professionals.  Much like the New York Times reporting on binding 
arbitration clauses, legal aid providers and plaintiffs’ lawyers will be the first 
 
 49. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL:  THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 16–43 (2015). 
 50. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Resnik, supra note 2, at 2810, 2885–87; see also 
DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 463 (2015). 
 51. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1107, 1137 (2013). 
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to explain that binding arbitration largely favors the drafters of adhesion 
contracts and that there is very little ground for court review.52 
This moment of interaction between laypeople and legal professionals is 
fundamental to understanding how predispute binding arbitration clauses 
degrade the rule of law and the legitimacy of public legal institutions.  These 
legal professionals must explain the actual meaning, significance, and effect 
of binding consumer-arbitration clauses.  For example, they will likely 
explain that binding arbitration often favors industry as a repeat player and 
seldom the one-shot player,53 that there is seldom any ground for judicial 
review of an arbitrator’s decision,54 and that in many jurisdictions, an 
arbitrator need not even explain his or her decision.55  Similarly, if the 
member of the public is an employee who has a grievance against an 
employer, these legal professionals will explain that employees win less often 
and less money in arbitration than in litigation,56 that arbitration is not a 
hospitable venue for unrepresented claimants,57 and that predispute binding 
arbitration clauses, given the prevalence of class action waivers, essentially 
eradicate class actions and group litigation.58 
Finally, plaintiffs’ lawyers will explain that given the likelihood that the 
claimant will not prevail and, hence, that these legal professionals will not be 
compensated with contingency fees or prevailing statutory fee awards, the 
aggrieved member of the public will likely be unable to secure legal 
representation.59  If members of the public have claims that they cannot 
reasonably present on their own pro se, then it is virtually certain that they 
will fail to receive meaningful legal relief or access to justice.  From this 
 
 52. Members of the public rarely know that a contract contains a predispute binding 
arbitration clause. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 18–22 (“[O]ver three-
fourths stated that they did not know whether their card issuers used pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses (78.8%).”).  Hence, lawyers and legal aid providers are often the first to inform 
claimants about the significance of predispute binding arbitration clauses. 
 53. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 96, 97–100 (1974); Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 
10, at 57; Margaret Jane Radin, Access to Justice and Abuses of Contract, 33 WINDSOR Y.B. 
ACCESS TO JUST. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2735011 [https://perma.cc/9BGV-XAKW]. 
 54. See Welsh, supra note 4, at 206–09. 
 55. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331, 397–98; see also Michael S. Barr, Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Finance and 
Investor Contracts, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 793, 809 (2015); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy 
and Dispute Resolution:  The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 301 
(2004). 
 56. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in 
Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 80 (2014); Sternlight, supra note 17, at 1312, 
1322–25. 
 57. See Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited:  What Kind 
of Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 78 
(2014).  Rules prohibit arbitrators from providing help to the parties. See UNIF. ARBITRATION 
ACT § 4 cmt. 4(c) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2000) (disallowing 
the neutral to assist, despite explicitly recognizing the possibility that power imbalances may 
exist between parties); Joseph L. Daly, Arbitration:  The Basics, 5 J. AM. ARB. 1, 12 (2006). 
 58. Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), with Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
 59. See Sternlight, supra note 17, at 1334–40. 
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angle, one observes a perspective in which predispute binding arbitration 
clauses prevent the effectuation of rights, including important civil rights 
enacted under federal law.60 
B.  Firms Are Incentivized to Use Predispute 
Binding Arbitration Clauses to Reduce Litigation Exposure 
From another angle, one can understand why predispute binding 
arbitration clauses are attractive to firms, businesses, and multinational 
companies.61  To begin, the Supreme Court has diffused and delegated 
decision-making authority to firms, allowing them to craft binding arbitration 
clauses and related dispute procedures with little judicial oversight.62  
Professor Nancy Welsh has described this diffusion and delegation as a form 
of institutional self-help, an opportunistic search for the funding and 
personnel that courts need to conduct fact-finding and decision making in 
cases that courts view as routine.63  Professor Margaret Radin has observed 
that the Supreme Court’s decisions are predicated on theories of private 
ordering and individual freedom.64 
As profit-seeking actors, firms seek to maximize their economic self-
interest within the wide discretion afforded by the Supreme Court.65  By way 
of analogy, it is within this extant legal structure that Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. famously elaborated that an actor will behave as a “bad man” 
going as far as the law will permit him to go, irrespective of ethical 
considerations or externalities that harm third parties or the public.66  For 
 
 60. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 2851 n.228. 
 61. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, in BOILERPLATE:  THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 3 (Omri Ben-
Shahar ed., 2007); Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE:  
THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, supra, at 200, 206; see also Randy E. Barnett, 
Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002). 
 62. See DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 476 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Today’s decision steps beyond Concepcion and Italian Colors.  There, as here, the Court 
misread the FAA to deprive consumers of effective relief against powerful economic entities 
that write no-class-action arbitration clauses into their form contracts.”); Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (“[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense 
involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to 
pursue that remedy.” (emphasis added)). 
 63. See Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences:  Litigant Preferences for Process and 
Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 162–163, 165; Welsh, supra 
note 4, at 193–98. 
 64. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE:  THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 19 (2012) [hereinafter RADIN, BOILERPLATE]; Margaret Jane Radin, An 
Analytical Framework for Legal Evaluation of Boilerplate, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONTRACT LAW 215 (G. Klass et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Radin, An Analytical 
Framework]. 
 65. Cf. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 26–27 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (4th ed. 1786) (“It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest.  We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”). 
 66. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–61 
(1897). 
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example, a firm may act in its own economic interest to reduce both 
exposures to liability and aggregate annual litigation expenditures by crafting 
adhesion contracts with predispute binding arbitration clauses.  Existing legal 
structures tolerate—indeed, perhaps encourage—adhesion contracts with 
predispute binding arbitration clauses.67 
Firms, therefore, harness the authority delegated to them under the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) to shield themselves as far as possible from liability.68  
For example, many firms require consumers to enter into adhesion contracts 
with binding arbitration clauses that ban class actions.  The difficulty is that 
when consumers have claims that are too small to rationally pursue on an 
individual basis (i.e., the negative-expected-value-suit problem69), these 
class action bans have the effect of negating liability for these harms.70  
Moreover, some firms have crafted adhesion contracts that bar injunctive and 
declaratory relief.71  Others employ adhesion contracts that require 
consumers to travel to distant forums to arbitrate.72  Finally, scholars have 
written about the incentives that these firms may have to capture arbitral 
bodies and the extent to which the repeat-player effect and funding sources 
may bias and influence arbitrators’ decision making.73 
C.  The Societal Effect Is a Tragedy of the Commons 
That Degrades the Rule of Law and Civil Justice System 
While each firm acts in its own independent economic self-interest, taken 
together the cumulative effect of this conduct is a tragedy of the commons.74  
 
 67. See Arbitration:  Is It Fair When Forced?:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 9–11 (2011) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Senior Attorney, Public 
Justice); Resnik, supra note 2, at 2870.  We note that the term “firm” encompasses all 
economic entities, including law firms. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002). 
 68. See Glover, supra note 1, at 3061–32. 
 69. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected Value, in 3 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 551–54 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 70. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 13, at 888; Imre Stephen Szalai, Correcting a Flaw in 
the Arbitration Fairness Act, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 271, 282. 
 71. See Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms:  
Challenging “Anti-Reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, 470–
71, 472 n.12 (2015). 
 72. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 53–55; see also Linda S. 
Mullenix, Gaming the System:  Protecting Consumers from Unconscionable Contractual 
Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (2015). 
 73. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 
697; Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness?:  The Case Against the Arbitration 
Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 273–74 (2008). 
 74. Cf. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 64, at 36.  It bears noting that firms, executives, 
and elite lawyers exhibited a high degree of coordination when devising a legal strategy to 
broaden the liability shielding power of these predispute binding arbitration clauses with class 
action waivers. See generally Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), 
aff’d, 630 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015); Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability:  The 
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 398–
99 (2005); Nancy A. Welsh & Stephan J. Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.:  The 
Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, 21 DISP. 
RESOL. MAG. 18, 18–19 (2014). 
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As the prevalence of these clauses rises and most transactions that consumers 
enter contain predispute binding arbitration clauses, the legitimacy and 
justness of our civil justice system and the rule of law erode.  Increasingly, 
firms conclude that it is in their independent economic interest to “defect” 
from or opt out of public legal institutions by adopting predispute binding 
arbitration clauses that subtly bias the results of this dispute procedure in their 
favor.75  When wide swaths of the public learn that their grievances must be 
arbitrated using a dispute-resolution procedure that favors the repeat player 
and that there is no judicial review, trust in the courts and the rule of law 
wanes, and the perceived legitimacy and justness of our civil justice system 
degrades.  Professor Radin refers to the effect of mass-market boilerplate 
rights-deletion schemes as “democratic degradation.”76  In short, the 
interaction of these conditions and clauses operates to diminish the 
legitimacy and justness of our legal institutions. 
D.  Zealous Advocacy Is a Cause and Consequence 
Transactional attorneys serve clients and draft adhesion contracts within 
this legal landscape and, thus, face tension between the norm of zealous 
advocacy and a wider virtuous ethic that seeks to limit harm to third parties 
and takes responsibility for the quality of justice.  A transactional attorney, 
whether in-house or outside counsel, drafts adhesion contracts for clients who 
seek to advance their economic interests, regardless of harm to public 
institutions.  Consent to adhesion contracts is illusory as the public neither 
reads nor understands their terms.  Therefore, transactional attorneys have 
marked leeway and power to draft binding arbitration clauses within adhesion 
contracts that members of the public will “accept.”77 
A transactional attorney who serves as a zealous advocate will seek to 
maximize his or her client’s economic interest with zeal.  In this regard, the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state, “As advisor, a lawyer 
provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights 
and obligations and explains their practical implications.  As advocate, a 
 
 75. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 9, at 16–17; Glover, supra note 1, at 
3074–76. 
 76. See RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 64, at 15–18, 33; Reuben, supra note 55, at 279, 
309–18; cf. Tyler, supra note 5, at 375 (“Being legitimate is important to the success of 
authorities, institutions, and institutional arrangements since it is difficult to exert influence 
over others based solely upon the possession and use of power.”).  This erosion to the 
democratic backdrop complicates the theory that adjudication is purely a private good. See 
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). 
 77. Scholars have noted that the Supreme Court now treats binding arbitration clauses 
more favorably than other clauses within adhesion contracts; for example, other clauses within 
adhesion contracts are subject to a variety of contract-related defenses. See Peter B. Rutledge 
& Christopher Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses?:  The Use of Arbitration Clauses After 
Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 974 (2014) (“[A] nonarbitral class 
waiver . . . poses greater risks of court invalidation.  After Concepcion, the FAA provides a 
substantial degree of protection for arbitral class waivers; nonarbitral class waivers have no 
such federal law backing.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy:  Stolt-
Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 323, 389–90 (2011). 
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lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary 
system.”78  From this perspective, the primary ethical principle governing 
transactional lawyers is to advocate their client’s private interest with zeal, 
rather than to weigh whether the public’s interest in a just, fair, and legitimate 
civil justice system is inimical to their client’s interest.79  The principle of 
zealous advocacy points these transactional attorneys toward taking their 
clients as far as they can go within the broad delegation and discretion of 
decision-making authority that the Supreme Court allows.  Zealous advocacy 
makes it likely that transactional lawyers will encourage their clients to opt 
out of public legal institutions and into binding arbitration and to craft 
predispute binding arbitration clauses within adhesion contracts that robustly 
advance their client’s economic interests.80 
In short, it is highly unlikely that those who zealously draft and design 
adhesion contracts will consider the public’s perspective or enact dispute 
resolution procedures that truly lead to neutral, unbiased, and just outcomes.  
Instead, these zealous advocates will engage in zero-sum thinking and 
maximize one side—their client’s interest—when crafting adhesion contracts 
irrespective of degradation to civil justice and the rule of law.  Zealous 
advocacy impairs the legal infrastructure that supports private ordering and 
comes at the expense of the public’s ability to rely on a just legal 
infrastructure that the public demands in a vibrant democracy that abides by 
the rule of law.81 
E.  A Wider, More Virtuous Ethical Ideal 
Surely it is erroneous to conclude that these transactional attorneys must 
act as zealous advocates when crafting binding arbitration clauses within 
adhesion contracts.  Does the ethical principle of zealous advocacy even 
 
 78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016); see also id. r. 1.3 
cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client 
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).  The principle of zealous advocacy as 
expressed within the professional rules has waxed and waned across time.  For example, the 
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility previously stated, “The duty of a lawyer, 
both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds 
of the law.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1980).  While 
the ABA’s Ethical Considerations were not mandatory, they were aspirational and represented 
the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive and constituted a 
body of principles upon which lawyers can rely for guidance in many specific situations. See 
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 11 (1988) (discussing how wide 
and narrow understandings of this principle have dueled across time); see also Carol Rice 
Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy:  A Historical Perspective, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 381, 427–35 (2012); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084–90 (1988). 
 79. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:  REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 49–80 (2003); Austin Sarat, The Profession Versus the Public Interest:  
Reflections on Two Reifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1493 (2002). 
 80. Cf. COLL. OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COST 
EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  KEY ACTION STEPS FOR BUSINESS USERS, COUNSEL, 
ARBITRATORS & ARBITRATION PROVIDER INSTITUTIONS 1–3 (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al. eds., 
2010), http://www.thecca.net/sites/default/files/CCA_Protocols.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C2D-
NPE4]. 
 81. Cf. RADIN, BOILERPLATE, supra note 64, at 15–18, 33. 
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apply to transactional attorneys who craft adhesion contracts?82  According 
to Lon Fuller, the purpose of adversarialism is to ensure that, when legal 
officials deliberate, they are presented with plural perspectives.83  That is, 
adversarialism ensures that legal officials are adequately presented with each 
party’s account so that these legal officials can take the perspective of all 
sides before rendering a legal decision.  The site in which transactional 
attorneys labor, however, is far outside the courtroom or a context in which 
work product is zealously prepared to present a narrative to an impartial 
adjudicator.  As Professor David Luban has concluded, it would be error to 
enter a blanket claim of moral nonaccountability given how far we are from 
the purpose of adversarial ethics.84 
There are, however, wider and more virtuous ethical principles that apply 
to transactional attorneys who create binding arbitration clauses within 
adhesion contracts.  Indeed, attorneys have an ethical responsibility to protect 
the public’s interest in the quality of justice.  For example, the preamble of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct state:  “A lawyer, as a member of 
the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal 
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice.”85  Lawyers, moreover, serve a unique, indispensable role that 
mediates between their client’s interest and the public’s interest.86  Alexis de 
 
 82. Commentators are divided on whether the principle of zealous advocacy applies to 
lawyers beyond the litigation context. See Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1165, 1171 n.36, 1193 (2006); Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About 
Professionalism:  Core Values, Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1067, 
1069–70 (2007).  Leaving to one side the issue of whether transactional attorneys must act as 
zealous advocates under the model rules, the principle of zealous advocacy is a powerful social 
norm that influences the thoughts, feelings, and behavior of transactional attorneys. See Bruce 
A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 359 n.144 (1998); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1244–45 (1991). See 
generally Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net:  The Sociology of Legal Ethics in 
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837 (1998).  Socialization in the legal profession 
may transmit this social norm. See Michael Hatfield, Professionalizing Moral Deference, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 5–7 (2009) (“From the beginning of law school, a lawyer is 
idealized as a zealous advocate for her client’s objective.”).  Finally, the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, when contrasted with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
narrow the obligation to represent clients with zeal. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (“The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to 
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.”), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that 
might be realized for a client.”). 
 83. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 
(Harold J. Berman ed., 1961). 
 84. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 5, at 851; see also DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND 
HUMAN DIGNITY 62–64 (2007); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary 
System in a Postmodern Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 38–40 (1996). 
 85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY pmbl.; CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS pmbl. (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1908). 
 86. See Simon, supra note 78, at 1113–19. See generally Katherine R. Kruse, The 
Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2011); David Luban, The Noblesse 
Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717 (1988). 
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Tocqueville elaborated this wider ethic,87 Talcott Parsons expounded on it,88 
and Louis Brandeis also advanced this more virtuous principle.89  This ethical 
principle would require lawyers not to engage in actions that erode the 
legitimacy of the civil justice system or public institutions.  Finally, drawing 
on Aristotelian virtue ethics, the role of an attorney should be imbued with 
an ethical responsibility that goes beyond maximizing their client’s self-
interest—attorneys have an ethical role and responsibility to protect the 
interest of the public as well.90  In sum, under this wider and more virtuous 
ethical ideal, transactional attorneys behave unethically when crafting 
adhesion contracts that erode our civil justice system and the legitimacy of 
legal institutions. 
Doubtless, there is tension between the ethical principle of zealous 
advocacy and this wider ethical ideal.  On the one hand, zealous advocacy 
advances the economic interests of a client and may result in adhesion 
contracts with manifestly unjust clauses.  On the other hand, a wider and more 
virtuous ethical ideal would have transactional attorneys protect the public’s 
interest in the rule of law and the viability of just legal institutions when 
engaging in dispute-system design.91 
F.  Implications of Behavioral Legal Ethics 
and Social Psychological Research 
Even so, we should not conclude that transactional lawyers who do not 
abide by this wider and more virtuous ethical principle are unethical people.  
Decades of social psychological research underscore that situational 
influences and roles within environments powerfully shape the way people 
 
 87. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267–70 (J.P. Mayer ed., 
George Lawrence trans., HarperPerennial 1988) (1835) (discussing the role that lawyers play 
in public life and preserving democratic institutions); see also Phil C. Neal, De Tocqueville 
and the Role of the Lawyer in Society, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 607 (1967). 
 88. See TALCOTT PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370, 370–71 (rev. ed. 1954) (elaborating the role of lawyers as serving 
both clients and the public interest, a role that maintains stability and dynamism in democratic 
society); TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra, at 34, 38. 
 89. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS:  A PROFESSION 325 
(1925) (discussing the role of lawyers in protecting public interest); see also Robert F. 
Cochran, Jr., Louis D. Brandeis and the Lawyer Advocacy System, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 351, 354–
56 (2013). 
 90. See Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer:  Part One of a 
Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J.L. PROF. 5, 29 (1996); see also 
ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE (E.V. Riece ed., J.A.K. Thompson trans., Penguin 
Books 1955) (n.d.).  From this perspective, an Aristotelian account of virtue ethics is in marked 
tension with an account that would permit an amoral role morality for legal professionals. See 
W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Butlers:  The Remains of Amoral Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 161 (1995). 
 91. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5; cf. Roger C. Cramton, Furthering 
Justice by Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1603–04 (2002); Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the 
Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1680–82 (2002); Thomas D. Morgan, 
Practicing Law in the Interests of Justice in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1793, 1796–97 (2002). 
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think, feel, and behave.  Professors Jennifer Robbennolt, Jean Sternlight, 
Andrew Perlman, and others have elaborated an approach known as 
behavioral legal ethics, which weaves together social psychology and legal 
ethics to better understand the experiences of lawyers within firm cultures 
and the way they make meaning within their environments.92  Importantly, 
social psychological research on the fundamental attribution error (also 
referred to as the correspondence bias) reveals that we overestimate the 
extent to which people’s actions, especially their apparently virtuous or 
unethical actions, reflect the kind of people that they are and that we 
underestimate the extent to which their conduct is the product of situational 
influences.93  Regarding such situational influences, Kurt Lewin developed 
the “field theory,” which explores the causes and conditions that influence 
people within a given situation.94  According to Lewin, a “field” refers to the 
psychological context that individuals experience in a particular point in 
time.95  Lewin identified two opposing forces present in any given field:  
“channels” that drive people toward a goal96 and “barriers” that inhibit 
movement toward that goal.97 
Transactional lawyers, both in-house and within law firms, encounter a 
context in which clients seek to maximize their economic interest in all of 
their transactions, including when creating adhesion contracts.  In the 
parlance of Lewin’s field theory, there are many “channel factors” that make 
it much more likely that these lawyers will serve as zealous advocates rather 
than rise to a wider and more virtuous ethical principle.  For example, a 
salient norm in these environments is the norm of serving a client’s economic 
interest.98  Far less salient is the ethic of contemplating and avoiding various 
courses of actions that harm the public’s long-term interest in the quality of 
justice.  Moreover, social psychological research reveals that face-to-face 
encounters with clients (and senior partners) increase the likelihood that 
midlevel transactional lawyers will zealously advance client interests when 
 
 92. See generally Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 
1639 (2015); Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Ethics:  Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be 
Their Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2015); Nancy B. Rapoport, 
“Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior:  Using Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior 
in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 42 (2014); Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, Behavioral Ethics Meets Legal Ethics, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 75 (2015); 
Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 51, at 1107–09. 
 93. See generally SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION:  FROM 
BRAINS TO CULTURE (2013); DANIEL T. GILBERT, SPEEDING WITH NED:  A PERSONAL VIEW OF 
THE CORRESPONDENCE BIAS (1998); RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:  
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980). 
 94. See KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951); see also THOMAS 
GILOVICH & LEE ROSS, THE WISEST ONE IN THE ROOM:  HOW YOU CAN BENEFIT FROM SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY’S MOST POWERFUL INSIGHT 42–70 (2015). 
 95. LEWIN, supra note 94, at 48–53. 
 96. Id. at 174. 
 97. Id. at 40. 
 98. See Cramton, supra note 91, at 1603; Dolovich, supra note 91, at 1682; Morgan, supra 
note 91, at 1797; see also Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
411, 437 (2008); Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”:  How Change in Client 
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal 
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 670–72 (2002). 
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crafting dispute-resolution clauses within adhesion contracts.99  Further, 
research on the foot-in-the-door technique suggests that these lawyers will 
likely behave as zealous advocates of their clients’ interests when drafting 
predispute binding arbitration clauses given the many other transactions in 
which these lawyers already seek to advance their client’s economic 
interests.100 
Finally, research on cognitive dissonance suggests that lawyers may 
reappraise their conduct as reasonable and normative.101  For example, social 
psychological research reveals that our past behavior influences the way we 
feel and think about that behavior.102  Indeed, a consistent finding in the 
behavioral science literature is that people’s behavior is often more predictive 
of their attitudes than their attitudes are of their behavior.103  Rather than 
believing that they are behaving unethically, these transactional lawyers will 
likely reappraise their past actions as rational, necessary, and just.  For 
example, they may rationalize predispute binding arbitration as faster, 
cheaper, and better.104  Or perhaps they may reappraise their conduct as 
normative, believing it would harm their client’s interests not to employ these 
clauses with terms that reduce their client’s liability exposure, especially 
when many other companies are engaging in the same practice. 
 
 99. See GILOVICH & ROSS, supra note 94, at 45–46; see also ROBERT L. NELSON, 
PARTNERS WITH POWER:  THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 282 (1988) 
(“[A]lthough large-firm lawyers embrace the ideology of professional autonomy in the 
abstract, when it comes to questions of legal policy that pertain to their practice they strongly 
identify with their clients’ positions and interests. . . .  [T]he reported incidence of 
disagreements between lawyers and clients is extremely rare, never occurring in the careers of 
three or four lawyers in my four-firm sample.”); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience 
by Subordinate Attorneys:  Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451 (2007) 
(“[L]awyers frequently find themselves in the kinds of contexts that produce high levels of 
conformity and obedience and low levels of resistance to illegal or unethical instructions.  The 
result is that subordinate lawyers . . . will find it difficult to resist a superior’s commands in 
circumstances that should produce forceful dissent.”). 
 100. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 47 (2009). See generally Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without 
Pressure:  The Foot-in-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 195 
(1966). 
 101. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 33 (Stanford Univ. Press 
1962) (1957); Elliot Aronson, Dissonance, Hypocrisy, and the Self-Concept, in COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE THEORY:  PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 21 (Eddie 
Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1998). 
 102. See Paula M. Niedenthal et al., Embodiment in Attitudes, Social Perception, and 
Emotion, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 184, 189 (2005); Pitor Winkielman et al., The 
Embodied Emotional Mind, in EMBODIED GROUNDING:  SOCIAL, COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND 
NEUROSCIENTIFIC APPROACHES 263, 263 (Gün R. Samin & Eliot R. Smith eds., 2008). 
 103. See generally Laura R. Glasman & Dolores Albarracin, Forming Attitudes That 
Predict Future Behavior:  A Meta-Analysis of the Attitude-Behavior Relation, 132 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 778 (2006). 
 104. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Releases Poll Showing Arbitration Faster, Simpler and Less 
Costly Than Litigation, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Apr. 13, 2005), http:// 
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/us-chamber-releases-poll-showing-arbitration-
faster-simpler-and-less-costly-than-litigation [https://perma.cc/UHU6-UVKC]; cf. Donald C. 
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?:  A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility 
for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 78, 101–10 (1993) (discussing the rationalization 
that ensues after lawyers engage in conduct that harms the public). 
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There are certainly barriers to a wider ethic as well.  For example, the ethic 
that considers the long-term public interest is not salient within these 
environments.  Moreover, there are no clear exit options out of this ethical 
dilemma.  Transactional lawyers who wishes to rise to a higher ethical ideal 
must opt out of the default norm of zealously advancing their client’s 
economic interest, perhaps by confronting their client, which may well 
imperil their livelihood.105  The interaction of these channels and barriers 
underscores that it is much more likely for transactional attorneys to 
reappraise their conduct as reasonable and just and to draft predispute binding 
arbitration clauses that zealously advance their client’s interests. 
G.  Changing Default Rules and Allowing 
the Wider Ethical Principle to Flourish 
When taken together, the wider ethical principle is frustrated by the 
interaction of the broad delegation of authority to firms that harness 
predispute binding arbitration clauses with little oversight, the incentive to 
maximize a client’s own economic interest, and the situational influences that 
transactional lawyers encounter within their working environments.  As a 
practical matter, the interaction of these powerful causes and conditions 
endanger the wider ethical ideal.  Urging transactional lawyers to rise to a 
wider, more virtuous ethic will have little effect on the status quo.106 
Yet the wider ethical principle may flourish if the default rules that broadly 
defer and delegate authority to firms are restructured.  For example, greater 
regulatory or judicial oversight of predispute binding arbitration clauses will 
alter the behavior of firms and, by implication, the transactional lawyers who 
draft these clauses on behalf of their clients.107  Professor Radin has argued 
that greater oversight and regulation are justified based on the theory that 
firms should be allowed to maximize their own profit, but within limits.108  
Mainly, firms should not be permitted to erode the background legal 
conditions that make private ordering possible.  Instead, regulatory and 
judicial oversight should allow these firms to act in their self-interest, so long 
as they do not erode or degrade the commons of a viable, legitimate, and just 
 
 105. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 47 (2007) (“[A]fter 
lawyers have offered their ‘quiet counsel,’ they will still have to press forward with the 
representation if the client won’t be dissuaded.  Perhaps the lawyer can say that she gave 
morality the old college try, and her heart is pure.  Our worry, however, was not about impure 
hearts, but about dirty hands.”); cf. GILOVICH & ROSS, note 94, at 60 (“Even if participants 
decided that they wanted to get off the path they were on, it wasn’t at all clear how to do so.  
There was no clear exit out of the (traumatic) situation in which they found themselves.”).   
 106. See Kath Hall, Why Good Intentions Are Often Not Enough:  The Potential for Ethical 
Blindness in Legal Decision-Making, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS:  TAKING STOCK AND 
NEW IDEAS 210, 210 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2012); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Irony of 
Lawyers’ Justice in America, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1860–62 (2002). 
 107. Cf. Client Alert:  CFPB Attacks Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses, VORYS (Mar. 16, 
2015), http://www.vorys.com/publications-1459.html [https://perma.cc/NH7Q-3PZB].  Note 
that even the title of the article “alerts” clients to the possible regulation on the horizon, putting 
them on notice of the change in trade winds. See id. 
 108. See Radin, An Analytical Framework, supra note 64, at 220–21. 
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civil justice system.109  Moreover, while our legal culture imbues predispute 
binding arbitration clauses with legal meaning, symbolism, and qualities such 
as choice, consent, volition, and a sense of being bargained for, we should 
recall that from an ecological perspective, members of the public neither 
read, appreciate, understand, nor consider these clauses when coping with the 
actual demands of daily life.  Professor Arthur Leff noted several decades 
ago, “[S]uch clauses are things, the products of non-bargaining, similar to 
‘unilaterally manufactured commodities.’”110  Regulators and courts, 
therefore, have an important role to play in monitoring this boundary when 
deciding the permissibility of various forms of dispute-system design within 
adhesion contracts that force the public out of the formal civil justice system 
and that may impair our public legal institutions.111 
There are many other models of oversight across the globe that offer 
comparative guidance.  Indeed, the United States is one of the few Western 
liberal democracies where there are relatively few limitations upon the 
arbitrability of consumer disputes.112  Within the European Union, member 
states review clauses for fairness, and Sweden declares these clauses 
invalid.113  The United Kingdom and Germany impose other important 
limitations.114 
 
 109. See id. at 236–37; cf. Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist 
Proposals for Reform, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711, 712 (2016) (rejecting overbroad 
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 110. See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 147 (1970); see also 
Resnik, supra note 2, at 2870. 
 111. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory 
Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 250–51 (2004).  Depending on 
how this form of regulation is designed, this legal landscape may have the effect of positive 
liberty, promoting bona fide consent, individual autonomy, and human flourishing. See Hiro 
N. Aragaki, Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?, 91 
IND. L.J. 1143, 1148–53 (2016).  Scholars have encouraged different forms and standards of 
judicial review. See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded 
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Maureen A. Weston, The 
Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010). 
 112. See DirectTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 478 (2015) (“The Court’s ever-larger 
expansion of the FAA’s scope contrasts sharply with how other countries treat mandatory 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion.”).  In the United States, there are several 
areas in which predispute binding arbitration clauses are curtailed. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1026.36 (2016) (prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in loan documents for mortgage 
and home equity loans); Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-
Term Care Facilities, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,688, 68797 (Oct. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§ 483.70(n)) (“[W]e are prohibiting the use of pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements.”); 
cf. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012); Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 100 (May 24, 2016) 
(“[P]roposing regulations governing agreements that provide for the arbitration of any future 
disputes between consumers and providers of certain consumer financial products and 
services.”). 
 113. See, e.g., LAG OM SKILJEFÖRFARANDE (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1999:116) 
(Swed.) (The Swedish Arbitration Act). 
 114. See generally ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPL] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], §§ 1025–
1066, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_ 
zpo.html#p3524 (Ger.) (German Arbitration Act) [https://perma.cc/2GKD-9L92]; Practice 
Guideline No. 17, Guidelines for Arbitrators Dealing with Cases Involving Consumers and 
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By changing the regulatory environment, the incentives of firms and 
transactional attorneys would better align with the wider ethical ideal.  For 
example, predispute binding arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts could 
be deemed legally unenforceable.115  Instead, if firms wish to engage in 
binding arbitration with consumers and employees, these firms could be 
limited to using binding arbitration agreements that are entered into 
separately from the primary contract, after a dispute has arisen.  Indeed, New 
Zealand harnesses this model of regulatory oversight.116 
In this example, binding arbitration agreements would be enforceable only 
if they are entered into after a dispute has arisen and with the bona fide 
consent of both parties.  This change would make it more likely that a wider 
ethical standard would flourish and less likely that zealous advocacy would 
endanger this wider ethic.  As our empirical legal study suggests, members 
of the public learn about the meaning and significance of different dispute-
resolution procedures only after disputes arise.  Therefore, members of the 
public would consent to these clauses only if they perceived a benefit in doing 
so.  For example, members of the public would enter into these agreements 
if they believed that binding arbitration reduces cost and delay and that 
binding arbitration is truly as fair, just, neutral, and trustworthy as a formal 
legal proceeding.117  When making this assessment, many members of the 
 
Parties with Significant Differences of Resources, CIARB (2011), 
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 116. See, e.g., Arbitration Act 1996, s 11 (N.Z.). 
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arbitration. See, e.g., NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
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fairness index, would increase in importance. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration 
Fairness Index:  Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer 
and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985 
(2012). 
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public would likely consult with legal professionals about the significance of 
these postdispute binding arbitration clauses. 
This altered legal landscape would create a social-psychological channel 
that would make it more likely for a wider ethical ideal to flourish.  The 
lawyers who draft these postdispute binding arbitration clauses would need 
to empathize with and take the perspective of third parties while at the same 
time advancing their clients’ interests. 
This perspective taking is incredibly important in allowing the wider, more 
virtuous ethical ideal to flourish.  Of note, especially given the dialectic of 
the two ethical principles that animates our discussion, when transactional 
attorneys anticipate that plaintiffs’ lawyers will zealously guide members of 
the public into appropriate and fair dispute-resolution procedures, they will 
be far more likely to embrace a wider ethical ideal that considers the public’s 
concerns.  The ethic of zealous advocacy, therefore, plays a role in the social 
psychological dynamic that shifts defense-side interests to embrace a wider 
ethical ideal.  Stated differently, if transactional attorneys anticipate that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers will serve as zealous advocates who will direct clients to 
less expensive, less time-consuming procedures only if these procedures are 
equally just and fair, then defendants’ lawyers who craft these postdispute 
agreements will have a wider concern for creating just and fair dispute 
procedures.  Indeed, the success of these postdispute agreements would in 
large part be based upon the ability to engage in perspective taking.  Further, 
this legal landscape would create powerful social psychological barriers that 
would make it far less likely for a one-sided adversarial ethic to prevail.  
Again, postdispute binding arbitration agreements would require both sides 
to provide true consent.  As a result, transactional lawyers who draft and 
design these clauses would craft them so that the parties receive a mutual 
benefit sufficient to choose postdispute binding arbitration. 
This wider, more virtuous ethical perspective is crucial to prevent 
democratic degradation and the tragedy of the commons that endangers and 
threatens the vitality of our legal institutions.  Enhancing judicial and 
regulatory oversight of predispute binding arbitration clauses will both 
reduce the channel factors that incentivize transactional attorneys to 
zealously craft binding arbitration clauses within adhesion contracts, while at 
the same time diminishing the social psychological barriers that endanger the 
more virtuous, ethical ideal.  Ensuring the quality of justice is a collective 
and fragile endeavor, one demanding that transactional attorneys who craft 
and design adhesion contracts balance both the interests of their client with 
the needs and perspective of the public.  This synthesis will sustain and 
protect the fairness, legitimacy, and justice of our civil justice system in this 
era of vanishing trials. 
APPENDIX 
The following pages contain the three statistical tables referenced 
throughout this Article. 
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